Searched refs:CAP_BPF (Results 1 – 19 of 19) sorted by relevance
| /linux-6.12.1/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/ |
| D | cap_helpers.h | 12 #ifndef CAP_BPF
13 #define CAP_BPF 39 macro
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| D | test_loader.c | 732 1ULL << CAP_PERFMON | 1ULL << CAP_BPF); in drop_capabilities()
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| D | test_verifier.c | 75 1ULL << CAP_BPF)
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| /linux-6.12.1/tools/bpf/bpftool/ |
| D | feature.c | 1049 #ifdef CAP_BPF in handle_perms()
1050 capability(CAP_BPF), in handle_perms()
1069 #ifdef CAP_BPF in handle_perms()
1070 if (CAP_IS_SUPPORTED(CAP_BPF)) in handle_perms()
1112 #ifdef CAP_BPF in handle_perms()
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| /linux-6.12.1/include/uapi/linux/ |
| D | capability.h | 412 #define CAP_BPF 39 macro
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| /linux-6.12.1/include/linux/ |
| D | capability.h | 202 return capable(CAP_BPF) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); in bpf_capable()
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| D | filter.h | 1304 if (bpf_jit_harden == 1 && bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in bpf_jit_blinding_enabled()
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| /linux-6.12.1/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ |
| D | verifier.c | 233 ret = cap_enable_effective(1ULL << CAP_BPF | 1ULL << CAP_NET_ADMIN, &caps); in test_verifier_mtu()
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| D | unpriv_bpf_disabled.c | 18 #define ALL_CAPS ((2ULL << CAP_BPF) - 1)
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| D | tc_bpf.c | 405 ret = cap_enable_effective(1ULL << CAP_BPF | 1ULL << CAP_NET_ADMIN, &caps); in tc_bpf_non_root()
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| D | token.c | 59 return cap_disable_effective((1ULL << CAP_BPF) | in drop_priv_caps()
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| /linux-6.12.1/kernel/bpf/ |
| D | token.c | 147 if (!ns_capable(userns, CAP_BPF)) in bpf_token_create()
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| D | syscall.c | 1113 if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) { in map_check_btf()
1290 if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) in map_create()
1325 if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) in map_create()
2676 bpf_cap = bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF); in bpf_prog_load()
4973 if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) { in bpf_btf_load()
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| D | helpers.c | 1947 if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in bpf_base_func_proto()
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| D | core.c | 691 !bpf_token_capable(fp->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in bpf_prog_kallsyms_add()
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| D | verifier.c | 22337 env->bpf_capable = is_priv = bpf_token_capable(env->prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF); in bpf_check()
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| /linux-6.12.1/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/ |
| D | net.rst | 108 CAP_BPF or CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the root user name space.
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| D | kernel.rst | 1597 once disabled, calling ``bpf()`` without ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN`` or ``CAP_BPF``
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| /linux-6.12.1/net/core/ |
| D | filter.c | 8683 if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in cg_skb_is_valid_access()
8695 if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in cg_skb_is_valid_access()
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