Lines Matching full:contents

15 contents and file names. This prevents attacks where an attacker is able to
16 read contents of the filesystem on a single point in time. A classic example
21 the attacker is able to modify the filesystem contents and the user uses the
23 contents arbitrarily without the user noticing. One example is to modify a
26 fairly easy to swap files and replace their contents.
36 This document describes an approach to get file contents _and_ full metadata
37 authentication for UBIFS. Since UBIFS uses fscrypt for file contents and file
100 contents or inode nodes (``struct ubifs_ino_node``) which represent VFS inodes.
210 the authenticity and integrity of metadata and file contents stored on flash.
218 authenticity of on-flash file contents and filesystem metadata. This covers
219 attacks where file contents are swapped.
221 UBIFS authentication will not protect against rollback of full flash contents.
232 wear-leveling operations of UBI which copies contents from one physical
247 - The index which includes file contents, file metadata like extended
249 - The journal which also contains file contents and metadata by recording changes
262 data, the hashes of their parent index nodes thus cover all the file contents
270 keyed hash (HMAC) over its own contents and a hash of the root node of the index
316 persist the hash and file contents. Here the existing UBIFS logic for how